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Moving Beyond Materialism: Can Transpersonal Psychology
Contribute to Cultural Transformation?
Steve Taylor

Leeds Beckett University
Leeds, UK
The issue of whether it is possible to separate science and metaphysics is discussed, with
reference to William James and the writings of quantum physicists. The metaphysical
framework of scientific materialism is analysed and some of its key assumptions are identified.
It is suggested that these assumptions are becoming increasingly untenable, as is evident by
the advocacy of post-materialist science by some contemporary scientists. The main appeal
of transpersonal psychology to students and practitioners is arguably its lack of allegiance to a
materialist metaphysics. Rather than allying itself to the metaphysical paradigm of naturalistic
science or attempting to bracket out metaphysics, transpersonal psychology should operate
openly within the framework of post-materialistic science. Rather than distancing itself from
areas such as near-death studies and parapsychology, it should embrace and cooperate with
them, sharing the same post-materialist perspective. Transpersonal psychology should not
attempt to reduce itself to fit into mainstream psychology but to try expand mainstream
psychology to include its concerns and principles. In a laudable attempt to pursue a more
scientific approach, some transpersonal theorists have arguably swung too extremely away
from essentialism/perennialism and metaphysics. It is hoped that a more balanced approach
may be found, incorporating more nuanced and phenomenological forms of perennialism,
and more cautious metaphysical claims.
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n concluding this dialogue, I would like to extend its
range. In addition to addressing some of the specific
points Hartelius has made, I would like to look at
some of the wider implications of the issues that have
been discussed. I will look at the issue of metaphysics
from a cultural perspective, and also address questions
about the role of transpersonal psychology, and its future.
I will also discuss questions regarding the scientific
status of transpersonal psychology, and its relationship
to mainstream psychology.
Hartelius (2017c) has made some helpful
comments about how the field of transpersonal
psychology can influence mainstream psychology. I
will follow his lead with some suggestions of my own,
extending the debate beyond the field of psychology to
discuss the possible cultural influences of transpersonal
psychology. I will argue that the materialist metaphysical
model that has dominated secular culture since the
end of the nineteenth century has had profoundly
detrimental psychological, cultural, and environmental
consequences. There is an argument that, in order

to flourish, Western culture has to adopt alternative
metaphysical perspectives. A significant development in
this regard is the “post-materialist science” movement
which challenges the fundamental assumptions of
materialism. In my experience (which may not be
representative, of course), the primary appeal of
transpersonal psychology for students and practitioners
is that it points toward “post-materialist” metaphysical
perspectives. Whereas mainstream psychology tends to
ally itself to materialism, transpersonal psychology has
traditionally suggested alternative views of reality. Rather
than attempting to appear metaphysically neutral or to
bracket out metaphysics—or even adopting the principles
of scientific naturalism (Ferrer, 2014)—transpersonal
psychology should actively reject materialism and openly
adopt post-materialist perspectives, allowing them to
inform its approach. In doing so, the field could make a
real contribution to the process of cultural change.
My argument is admittedly speculative and
provocative, and I am partly making it in the hope that it
will stimulate further discussion.
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The Metaphysics of Science
central theme of Hartelius’s (2017c) arguments
throughout this dialogue has been his view that
metaphysics is an unwelcome intruder into science,
and that it is best to attempt to separate the two areas.
Hartelius has argued that “the incorporation of religious
and metaphysical claims is not the province of any
psychology, transpersonal or otherwise” (p. 137). In his
latest response, he has suggested that those—including
me—who make such claims should be seen as spiritual
teachers and “warmly appreciated and encouraged to
continue their important work outside of the context of
psychology” (p. 137).
William James originally held a similar
view. When he began The Principles of Psychology,
James believed that psychology should be purely a
natural science. He argued that psychologists should
investigate the correlations between the mind and the
brain without pondering over their implications, which
would be trespassing into metaphysics. He advocated
a “descriptive psychology” that examined correlations
without investigating how they arose or what they
implied (Lambeth, 1999).
Soon afterwards, however, James revised his
views. He came to believe (and continued to believe for
the rest of his life) that it was futile and intellectually
dishonest to artificially separate natural science and
metaphysics (Lambeth, 1999; Kelly, 2007). According
to James a naturalistic “descriptive” psychology was
ungrounded and unstable, not “a sort of psychology that
stands at last on solid ground” but “just the reverse …
a psychology particularly fragile, into which the waters
of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint” (James,
1892, pp. 467–468). As James stated in his presidential
address to the American Psychological Society in 1894,
“no conventional restrictions can keep metaphysical and
so-called epistemological inquiries out of the psychology
books” (James, 1895/1978, p. 88). James came to believe
that psychology has to be grounded in some metaphysical
assumptions and that its investigations could, moreover,
make an important contribution to metaphysics by
helping to establish the nature of the mind-body
relationship (Kelly, 2007). (According to Lambeth
[1999] this shift in James’s approach coincided with
his rejection of mind/body dualism and his movement
towards a monistic metaphysics which saw mind and
body as different aspects of a more fundamental quality.)

In a similar fashion, I have argued that
even if psychologists (or scientists in general) do not
overtly address metaphysical issues, they are always
in the background, informing one’s perspective and
approach. Ferrer (2014) has made the same point while
critiquing the belief of some transpersonal theorists
that the field should adopt an approach reminiscent of
scientific naturalism. As Kelly (2007) has stated while
summarizing James’s position, “The real issue, in short,
is not whether we will have metaphysics [in psychology],
but whether we will have good metaphysics, or bad” (p.
632). In my view, bad metaphysics is when metaphysical
claims are abstract and speculative and ungrounded
in empirical research. Good metaphysics is when
metaphysical claims are inferred or implied by empirical
evidence, and are carefully developed and cautiously
stated. It might be said that bad metaphysics is also
when a metaphysical framework is unacknowledged or
hidden, as opposed to when it is overtly and explicitly
stated.
Hartelius (2015) has acknowledged that science
inevitably includes some metaphysical assumptions.
He has also acknowledged that his statement that
“consciousness in some form penetrates through all
physicality” (p. 26) is “just as unavoidably metaphysical
as the countervailing notion of naïve materialism”
(Hartelius, 2017c, p. 142).1 But where do these
assumptions end? Where is the cut-off point that
separates a “scientific” field with just a few metaphysical
assumptions from a religious or “New Age” field with a
lot of metaphysical assumptions? I agree that this may
not be an “all or nothing” position—at least in the
sense that one should try to exclude “bad” metaphysics.
It might be possible to exclude speculative discussions
about chakras, auras, and astral bodies—or abstract
conceptual systems—from transpersonal psychology.
Nevertheless, some form of metaphysical paradigm will
always be in the background, informing one’s attitude
and approach with assumptions (often unconscious and
unacknowledged) about the nature of reality.
In response to my account of early quantum
physicists who had a positive attitude to metaphysics,
Hartelius (2017c) has insisted that these physicists kept
their metaphysical musings out of their science. As he
has written, “While quantum physicists have engaged
in conversations that involve metaphysical speculation,
it is evident that they have also held a clear demarcation
between philosophy and science” (p. 137). However, if
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one looks at some of the actual writings of such quantum
physicists, this assertion seems doubtful. In many of
their books, these physicists freely mingled science
and metaphysics, describing some of their findings
and discussing what they implied about the nature of
reality, or of human consciousness, without making
any demarcation. For example, in books such as Physics
and Philosophy (1942/2009) and The Mysterious Universe
(1937), the British physicist James Jeans explicitly and
thoroughly examined the metaphysical implications of
modern physics. He stated that he was examining “that
borderland territory between physics and philosophy”
which “suddenly became so interesting and important
through recent developments of theoretical physics …
[with] questions which touch human life very closely,
such as materialism and free-will” (Jeans, 1942/2009,
p. 1). In The Mysterious Universe (1937) Jeans made the
well-known statement that, “The universe begins to
look more like a great thought than a great machine.
Mind no longer appears as an accidental intruder into
the realm of matter” (p. 137). Max Planck (1931) took a
similar approach in The Universe in the Light of Modern
Physics, describing how modern physics implied “realities
existing apart from our sense-perceptions, and that
there are problems and conflicts where these realities are
of greater value for us than the richest treasures of the
world of experience” (p. 107). Werner Heisenberg (1958)
took a similar approach in The Physicists’ Conception of
Nature, as did Erwin Schroedinger, Albert Einstein,
and Wolfgang Pauli in various books. The idea that
these physicists ceased to be scientists because they
addressed metaphysical issues—as Hartelius (2017c)
has suggested should be the case with me, since I have
a published a book with the subtitle The Psychology of
Spiritual Awakening (Taylor, 2017c) which incorporates
perennialist metaphysical claims—seems bizarre.
This shows how difficult it is separate science
and metaphysics. As William James concluded, it is
impossible to try to bracket out metaphysical claims or to
keep science and metaphysics in different compartments.
In reality, there is no boundary and they continually
merge into one another. As suggested in Taylor (2017b),
many contemporary scientists also routinely make claims
about the nature of mind or of reality itself, usually
within a materialist metaphysical framework that sees
human being as genetic machines, consciousness as a byproduct of brain activity, and human life as essentially
purposeless and meaningless.

The Metaphysics of Materialism
s noted above, William James believed that
psychology could make a significant contribution
to metaphysics, and I believe this is also the case with
transpersonal psychology at the present time. Succinctly
put, transpersonal psychology may be able to contribute
to a cultural movement beyond the metaphysical
framework of scientific materialism and towards a new
“post-materialist” metaphysics, as exemplified by the
contemporary “post-materialist science” movement.
(Beauregard et al., 2014). To develop my argument, it
will be necessary to briefly examine the metaphysical
framework of materialism in more detail and to highlight
some of its cultural effects. (Incidentally, let me make it
clear that the following section should not be taken as a
direct critique of Hartelius’s approach. I am not suggesting
that he advocates the naive materialist position which will
be described here.)
Materialism is a form of monism suggesting that
matter is the primary reality of the universe, and that
most significant phenomena can be explained in terms
of (or as epiphenomena of) the interactions of material
particles. There were some ancient philosophers who put
forward materialist views, particularly in ancient Greece
and Rome. (For example, the poetical tract The Nature
of Things by the Roman poet Lucretius [2007] described
the universe as a giant machine and explained mental
and physical phenomena in terms of tiny elementary
particles.) Similarly, some scientists began to adopt a
materialist metaphysics as early as the 17th century
(Ferrer, 2014), but materialism arguably only started to
become a prevalent metaphysical paradigm in Western
culture towards the end of the 19th century. With the
decline of religion there was a widespread realization
amongst intellectuals that the findings of science could be
adapted to provide a new conceptual framework to make
sense of the world. One fervent Victorian materialist was
T. H. Huxley (1874), who described human beings as
“conscious automata” (p. 577) with no free will. Another
prominent scientist of the time, Henry Maudsley (1879),
stated that “mind is an outcome and function of matter
in a certain state of organization” (p. 667).
An early expression of the materialist worldview
in psychology was behaviorism which suggested
that all human behaviour was simply the result of
environmental influences, and that mental phenomena
and consciousness itself could be disregarded, since
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they could not be observed. Later developments such
as cognitive psychology and biopsychology were
also underpinned with materialist assumptions. In
philosophy, a similar expression was the field of logical
positivism which held that only things that could be
observed and verified by the senses were meaningful,
and that metaphysical statements could be disregarded
because they could not be verified. The discovery of
genes offered a way of explaining human development
and behavior in terms of microcosmic elements and
led to a new interpretation of evolution (known as
Neo-Darwinism) which in turn led to the field of
evolutionary psychology. At the same time, the medical
advances of the twentieth century were amazingly
successful, lending support to the notion of the human
body as essentially a very complex machine that can
be fixed when it malfunctions. The fields of neurology
and neuroscience—facilitated by brain-imaging
technologies—applied to this model to the brain,
which was also seen as very complex machine whose
interactions could account for human experience and
behavior. All of these developments seemed to suggest
that the materialist-reductionist enterprise of paring
things down to their essential elements was valid. As a
result, materialism took hold as a dominant explanatory
paradigm.
Modern day scientific materialism includes
a number of assumptions—for example, that mental
phenomena and consciousness itself are the product
of neurological activity; that human beings and other
living beings are biochemical machines who exist in
ontological separation to one another, and who consist
of genes whose purpose is to survive and replicate; that
the origins and the evolution of life can be explained
in terms of accidental factors; that consciousness or
personal identity cannot continue following the death of
the body and brain; that human behavior and experience
are determined by genetic and neurological factors;
that the world and the universe are fundamentally
mechanistic and inert; that paranormal phenomena
cannot exist because they contravene the laws of nature,
and so on (Kelly et al., 2007; Nagel, 2012; Sheldrake,
2012; Beauregard et al., 2014).
Rather than being scientific facts, these tenets
of materialism are more accurately seen as metaphysical
extrapolations based on some scientific findings. This
is not science as such, but scientism, which is a quasireligion (Platinga, 2011; Sheldrake, 2012; Beauregard

et al,. 2014). For example, it is a fact that correlations
exist between consciousness and brain activity, but an
assumption that brain activity produces consciousness.
It is a fact that evolution has taken place, but an
assumption that it can be explained in terms of purely
accidental factors. It is a fact that atoms and molecules
exist, but an assumption that life can be explained in
purely physicalist terms.
There have undoubtedly been some positive
effects of materialism. Perhaps the rejection of the
idea of an afterlife has led to increased affirmation and
acceptance of this life. In a similar way, perhaps—as
Nietzsche (2005) believed—rejecting the concept
of God has liberated human beings and provided an
opportunity for self-development. The evolutionary
biologist Richard Dawkins (1998) has portrayed the
positive side of materialism in a similar way. Despite
the apparent bleakness of his mechanistic worldview, he
has suggested that meaning emerges from simple fact
of being alive in the world: “After sleeping through a
hundred million centuries we have finally opened our
eyes on a sumptuous planet, sparkling with colour,
bountiful with life” (p. 8).
Nonetheless, the metaphysical paradigm
of materialism has arguably had highly detrimental
effects. Philosophical materialism has arguably led to
consumerist materialism—a pervading hedonism and
individualism, stemming from a feeling that if this
world is all there is, and human beings are just genetic
machines, they may as well just enjoy themselves as
much as possible and take as much from the world as
they can, without worrying about the consequences
(Kastrup, 2014). In biomedical terms, materialism has
helped to establish a mechanistic model of the human
organism in which even psychological conditions
are treated as physical disorders that can be “fixed”
through pharmacological interventions, despite limited
and questionable evidence for the efficacy of widely
prescribed psychiatric drugs such as serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs; Kelly et al., 2007; Healy, 2015).
In environmental terms, it could also be argued that
materialism has encouraged and sanctioned an attitude
of domineering recklessness to the natural world in
which natural phenomena (which are after all no more
than chemical machines) only have a utilitarian value.
If nature is insentient and exists in otherness to human
beings, then it becomes little more than a supply of
resources (Taylor, in press).
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that human beings have far fewer genes than expected,
many of which are shared by other life forms. This makes
it difficult to explain the physical, neurological, and
behavioral complexity of human beings—and the full
range of differences between species—in genetic terms
(Sheldrake, 2012). The project was originally predicted
to bring about a revolution in healthcare, showing how
common diseases were caused by the inheritance of
faulty genes, but it was found that faulty genes have very
little role in predisposing human beings to disease (Hall,
2010; Sheldrake, 2012). The project also cast doubt on
the simplistic image of genes—put forward by Dawkins
(1976), for example—as self-contained, discrete pieces
of DNA with specific roles. The reality was found to
be much more complex than this, showing that most
genes cooperate and multitask. Single genes can code for
several different proteins and may have other roles too.
As a result, the genome project spelled the end of the
popular belief that there are “genes for” certain traits and
characteristics (Hall, 2010; Sheldrake, 2012).
In a more general way, the confidence of
neurological materialists has been dented by the lack
of any progress in attempts to explain consciousness in
neurological terms, as it looks increasingly unlikely that
there is any direct causal link between brain activity
and consciousness. As a result, panpsychist explanations
of consciousness have begun to seem more viable. As
the neuroscientist Cristof Koch (2014)—originally a
materialist who worked with Francis Crick for many years
to try to establish the neural correlates of consciousness—
has written:

Post-Materialism
aterialists tend to see themselves as in opposition
to traditional religion, with materialism as the
only viable alternative to a prerational mythic and
superstitious worldview (Nagel, 2012). However, there
are certainly other possibilities. A significant recent
development in science has been the “post-materialist
science” movement, founded by a group of scientists
including Mario Beauregard, Lisa Miller, and Gary
Schwartz (Beauregard et al., 2014). The aim of this
movement is to highlight the metaphysical assumptions
that underpin materialist science (as described above),
and to suggest that these are no longer viable, as they
cannot explain or account for many aspects of human
experience and multiple phenomena which appear
“anomalous” from the standpoint of materialism.
The post-materialist science movement has
its own explicit metaphysical assumptions which are
deemed to accord more closely with scientific evidence
and offer a more complete and cohesive explanation
of reality than the materialist model. One of these
assumptions is that “Mind represents an aspect of reality
as primordial as the physical world. Mind is fundamental
in the universe, i.e., it cannot be derived from matter
and reduced to anything more basic” (Beauregard et al.,
2014, p. 273). Other key assumptions are that “There is a
deep interconnectedness between mind and the physical
world” and that “Minds are apparently unbounded and
may unite in ways suggesting a unitary One Mind that
includes all individual single minds” (p. 273).
According to the post-materialist science
movement, in recent decades the metaphysical paradigm
of materialist science has become increasingly untenable.
A number of new scientific fields and an increasing
number of general scientific findings have begun to cast
doubt on many of its assumptions. As early as the 1990s,
Dupré (1993) described how materialist reductionism as
a strategy had met with widespread failure throughout
the fields of biology, genetics, ecology, and psychology.
While as Ferrer (2014) has summarized, “Important
contemporary trends in complexity theory, nonlinear
science, and neuroscience not only postulate diverse forms
of downward causation but also challenge the epistemic
superiority of reductionist explanations” (p. 155).
To take one specific example, the mapping of
the human genome—the so-called Genome Project, the
first draft of which was completed in 2000—discovered

As a result, Koch has adopted the panpsychist
view that consciousness is an inherent feature of the
universe. A diverse range of other findings from areas
such as neuroplasticity, placebo studies, psi experiments,
studies of near-death experiences, and modern physics
have added weight to the view that, rather than being
simply produced by brain activity, mind is nonmaterial
and fundamental to the universe (Kelly et al., 2007;
Kelly, Crabtree, & Marshall, 2015; Taylor, in press).
As Kelly (2007) has summarized, “The body conceived
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Emergence of subjective feelings from physical stuff
appears inconceivable …. The phenomenal hails from
a kingdom other than the physical and is subject to
different laws. I see no way for the divide between
unconscious and conscious states to be bridged by
bigger brains or more complex neurons. (p. 28)

conventionally as a physiological machine has proven
unable to count for all the properties of minds, and so
we must find a different theory that can better account
for the empirical data” (p. 630).
As a final example, the relatively new field of
quantum biology has shown that strange quantum
effects do not just occur inside atoms; they permeate the
macrocosmic world. Phenomena such as photosynthesis,
the navigation of some birds via the Earth’s magnetic
field, and the movement of protons inside molecules,
appear to involve quantum process such as entanglement,
non-locality, and “quantum tunneling” (Ball, 2011; AlKhalili & McFadden, 2014). This implies that it is no
longer possible to separate the quantum world from the
macrocosmic everyday world, pretending that it has
no significance. Materialists can no longer simply base
their worldview on the principles of Newtonian physics,
while ignoring the implications of quantum physics. As
is clear from the discussion of early quantum physicists
above, these findings strongly imply post-materialist
metaphysical perspectives—and at the very least, strongly
undermine the assumptions of materialism (Kelly at al.,
2007; Taylor, in press).
Arguably, unlike most other psychological
approaches, transpersonal psychology is traditionally
allied to post-materialist science. Due to its traditional
allegiance to Eastern spiritual traditions (which of course
offer alternative metaphysical perspectives), and its
investigations into the farther reaches of human nature
and anomalous phenomena, transpersonal psychology
has traditionally included (and sanctioned) postmaterialist metaphysical perspectives. In fact, for better
or worse, the field has traditionally attracted individuals
who are disenchanted with the materialist metaphysical
paradigm and are keen to investigate alternative models
of reality. Certainly, in my own experience of teaching
transpersonal psychology courses at my university and
attending transpersonal psychology conferences, this has
appeared to be the primary appeal of the field.
Rather than attempting to adopt the
metaphysical paradigm of naturalistic science—as Ferrer
(2014) has suggested of transpersonal psychologists
such as Friedman and MacDonald—and rather than
attempting to be metaphysically neutral or to bracket
out metaphysics, it would surely be more advisable for
transpersonal psychology to accept its natural allegiance
to post-materialistic science, to adopt its metaphysical
perspective, and to allow it to inform its approach. It

could be argued that, in recent years, there has been a
tendency for some transpersonal psychologists to look in
the wrong direction—towards materialism, rather than
post-materialism.
It is important to point out that this does not just
mean adhering to one particular metaphysical position.
There are many forms of post-materialist metaphysics,
including panpsychism (which itself includes many
different varieties, such as panexperientialism and
panprotopsychism), idealism, panentheism, dual-aspect
monism, and non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist models.
So, adopting a general post-materialist metaphysical
outlook does not necessarily entail ceasing to be pluralistic.
Nevertheless, these approaches share commonalities—
most fundamentally, their rejection of the materialist
view that matter is the primary reality of the universe
and that mental phenomena are reducible to materialist
causes. In contrast, these approaches infer that mind
(or consciousness) is at least as fundamental as matter,
and is possibly even (according to some approaches) a
fundamental universal quality that precedes matter. As
well as positing a different relationship between mind
and brain, these approaches allow for a more complex
understanding of phenomena such as evolution, death
(including the possibility of an afterlife), spiritual
experiences, and psychic phenomena (Kelly et al., 2007;
Nagel, 2012, Kelly et al., 2015; Taylor, in press).
Since perennialism has been a major topic of
this debate, it is important to consider its relationship
with post-materialist perspectives. Soft perennialism
(or essentialism) can be seen as a post-materialist
interpretation of spiritual experiences and traditions,
as opposed (for example) to a materialist interpretation
which sees spiritual experiences as simple products
of neurological activity. Soft perennialism is an
interpretation which is inferred from—and supported
by—post-materialistic perspectives that view mind
or consciousness as a fundamental and/or universal
quality. Arguably, panpsychism does not support the
soft perennialist model, since it does not posit a universal
non-material quality or essence, but only that all matter
has a mental aspect to it, and therefore a certain degree of
sentience. However, post-materialist perspectives such as
idealism and dual-aspect monism do allow for the claims
of soft perennialism, since they do posit a fundamental or
universal non-material quality.
Soft perennialism posits an immanent and allpervading spiritual force or essence which is conceptualized
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in different ways by different spiritual traditions. In
contemplative or mystical traditions associated with
monotheistic religions, it is conceptualized in theistic
terms, while in other traditions it is conceptualized in
terms of fundamental spiritual principles such as brahman,
tao, or dharmakaya. It is also conceived in various (but
similar) ways by many indigenous cultures. This spiritual
force is the essence of everything that exists, so that there
is a fundamental interconnectedness between all things.
It is also the essence of one’s own being—as is sometimes
directly sensed in experiences of “pure consciousness” —
so that human beings are fundamentally interconnected
with (and even actually one with) all things, including all
other human beings (Taylor, 2016). These claims accord
very well with the post-materialist scientific claims that
“mind is fundamental in the universe,” that “there is a
deep interconnectedness between mind and the physical
world,” and that “minds are apparently unbounded and
may unite in ways suggesting a unitary, One Mind that
includes all individual, single minds” (Beauregard et al.,
2014, p. 273).
It is also worth remembering that it is impossible
to avoid metaphysics. Transpersonal psychology cannot
help but be grounded in, or allied with, some form of
metaphysical paradigm—and it is surely preferable
for the field to ally itself to post-materialist scientific
perspectives rather than to some form of materialism.
The Contribution of Transpersonal Psychology
artelius (2017c) has argued that rather than
separating itself as an “elite spiritual community”
transpersonal psychology should “engage with and
influence the field of psychology” (p. 143). He has also
suggested a number of ways in which transpersonal
psychology can influence the mainstream. I agree with
this approach and his assertion that transpersonal
psychology is “one of the very few orientations currently
capable of mounting the sort of challenge urgently needed
as a corrective for contemporary psychology” (p. 144).
But unlike Hartelius, I believe that, most fundamentally,
transpersonal psychology should challenge and influence
mainstream psychology by committing itself to a postmaterialist metaphysical approach and encouraging
mainstream psychology to move beyond its present materialist
metaphysics, towards post-materialist perspectives.
This is a valuable contribution that transpersonal
psychology can make—not just to the field of psychology,
but to the whole of science and by extension, to the whole

of Western culture. (Of course, there is no reason why
transpersonal psychology should necessarily have any
cultural role or any social responsibility, but this is an
approach it could take.) One could make a comparison
to studies of near-death experiences or of paranormal
phenomena. These areas are fiercely debated precisely
because they threaten the basic assumptions of the
materialist metaphysical model. Thus, adherents to
materialism often go to great lengths to try to explain
away the apparent positive findings of psi experiments
or to explain near-death experiences in neurological or
physiological terms (Kelly et al., 2007; Carter, 2010;
Sartori, 2014; Taylor, in press). This is because these
phenomena are, one might say, potential metaphysical
“game-changers.” That is, if they were proven to be real,
they would undermine the materialist metaphysical
model. For example, if near-death experiences cannot
be explained in neurological or physiological terms,
then they strongly imply that consciousness can occur
independently of the brain, and so is not directly
produced by brain activity. If telepathy is real, there is an
implication that one’s own thoughts do not simply exist
within one’s own private mental space, as a product of
neurological activity, but that mind is somehow shared
collectively, as something more fundamental than the
brain, or matter in general. (On the other hand, if it
could be categorically shown that these phenomena
can be wholly explained in materialistic terms, then
this would confirm the materialist model.) As a result,
research in these areas is immensely valuable.
One can make a similar claim for research in
transpersonal psychology. In my view, the investigation
of higher states of consciousness or spiritual (or
awakening) experiences, of the effects of psychospiritual transformative practices or substances (such
as meditation, mindfulness, or psychedelics) and
ongoing states of personal or spiritual transformation,
is as significant as the investigation of NDEs or psi
experiences. Similarly to their approach to NDEs and
psychic phenomena, adherents to materialism tend to
explain spiritual experiences in terms of abnormal or
aberrational neurological activity. As Mahner (2012)
has stated, modern science has excluded “supernatural”
phenomena as a metaphysical supposition. Like
NDEs, spiritual experiences are often interpreted as
hallucinations or delusions (Aaen-Stockdale, 2012).
Another characteristic of materialism is a
naïve faith in the objectivity and reliability of ordinary
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awareness. There is an assumption that, in an ordinary
state of awareness, the world is seen in a reliable and
objective way, and that nonordinary (or altered) states
of awareness can only be inauthentic, and the worldview
they present can only be illusory. In other words, there is
an assumption of the hegemony of ordinary awareness—
the assumption that ordinary awareness is superior to
any other form of awareness.
In a similar way to studies of NDEs and psychic
phenomena, therefore, transpersonal psychology could
challenge the hegemony of ordinary awareness and
play an essential role in establishing the authenticity of
expansive states of being. It could suggest the existence
of wider realms of experience than those conceived
of by materialism, pointing to what Ferrer (2014)
has described as “the plausibility of a deep and ample
multidimensional cosmos in which the sensible world
(as narrowly conceived by modern naturalism) does not
exhaust the possibilities of the Real” (p. 170).2
Even more importantly, by analyzing the
transformative effects of psychospiritual practices—and
instances of spontaneous transformation—transpersonal
psychology may help to make expansive states of being
more culturally acceptable and more accessible. In
this way, transpersonal psychology can contribute to a
shift towards post-materialist perspectives. Most NDE
researchers, parapsychologists, and psi researchers do not
refrain from stating the metaphysical implications of their
research (for example, Van Lommel, 2006; Sartori, 2014;
Radin, 2009; Sheldrake, 2012), and there is no reason
why transpersonal psychologists should do so either. For
transpersonal psychology, this would also mean embracing
such fields as parapsychology and near-death studies as
natural bedfellows, rather than excluding them on the
grounds that a scientific field should have no dealings
with supernatural or transcendent experiences (Friedman,
2013).
In fact, it could be argued that transpersonal
psychology has traditionally taken this approach,
and this is what has traditionally differentiated it
from more mainstream psychological approaches.
Within psychology, and Western culture as a whole,
transpersonal psychology has traditionally offered
and explored post-materialist perspectives, including
essentialism or perennialism (Ferrer, 2002). There is
therefore a danger that, if transpersonal psychology
attempts to bracket out metaphysics, or even allies itself
to the materialist metaphysical paradigm (Ferrer, 2014),

Common Ground
t this point, there is some common ground with
Hartelius. Like him, I believe that the best way that
transpersonal psychology can influence mainstream
psychology and contribute to cultural change is by
taking a more empirical, research-based approach and
by becoming less oriented around Eastern wisdom
traditions. Hartelius (2017c) has mentioned that in recent
years among his students there has been “a shift toward
greater interest in empirical data and research” (p. 143).
This is a very positive development, and I am pleased to
say that in the UK we have made similar progress in our
transpersonal psychology-based degree courses, both at
my university (Leeds Beckett University) and elsewhere.
More and more students are choosing transpersonal
topics for their dissertations and pursuing these with
scientific rigor.
Transpersonal psychology has traditionally been
too speculative, conceptual, and theoretical. It is not
enough to simply formulate theories or models and try
to justify them in terms of previous research, in terms of
the internal coherence and seeming validity of the theory
itself, or in relation to other theories. It is important to
test concepts and theories, and not to just leave them
hanging in abstract space. This was a weakness of
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then it would lose this essential role. It would cease to be
distinguishable from other psychological approaches—
such as positive psychology or anomalistic psychology—
and possibly be subsumed by them, and therefore cease
to exist. Also, significantly for the longstanding viability
of the field, this may mean losing its traditional appeal
to students and practitioners. (In a more general sense,
this is a potential issue with the recommendation by
transpersonal theorists, such as Friedman [2013] and
MacDonald [2013], that transpersonal psychology
should be a naturalistic science, excluding metaphysical
and supernatural concerns, together with supposedly
nonscientific approaches such as hermeneutics or
contemplative methodologies. At a certain point, there
is a sense that the “trans” is being removed from the
“transpersonal.”) Rather than attempting to change
itself so that it can become integrated into mainstream
psychology, transpersonal psychology should rather
continue its efforts to change mainstream psychology.
Rather than reducing itself to try to fit into the
mainstream, transpersonal psychology should try to
broaden the mainstream.

A

Wilber’s model—rather than being firmly grounded in
research, it was largely an abstract metaphysical system,
and therefore an example of “bad metaphysics,” in terms
of Kelly’s (2007) distinction. As a result, I have been keen
to encourage and contribute to research projects, and to
refine and improve my approach to research on an ongoing
basis. I believe that transpersonal psychology can benefit
from a whole range of different approaches to research,
from contemplative methodologies to quantitative and
psychometric approaches.
At the same time, whilst the wisdom traditions
are a great source of insight and guidance, it is essential
for transpersonal psychology to study experiences that
occur outside their contexts. As suggested in Taylor
(2016), awakening experiences (or ongoing states of
wakefulness) may be interpreted within the context of
particular spiritual traditions, but they frequently occur
to individuals who have no background in or knowledge
of the traditions. According to the soft perennialist
model, spiritual and mystical experiences are glimpses of
expansive potential ranges of human experience that are
more fundamental than any particular tradition.
However, the main point of divergence with
Hartelius is that I do not believe that in order to
proceed in a more empirical, research-based direction
transpersonal psychology necessarily has to abandon a
perennial perspective, or eschew or attempt to bracket
out metaphysics. (Indeed, as suggested above, this would
possibly have a seriously deleterious effect.) Hartelius
(2017c) has claimed that “soft perennialism is based on
no valid evidence whatsoever” (p. 139, italics in original).
However, I would suggest that, as with his definitions of
science and metaphysics, Hartelius’s definition of evidence
is too narrow and is derived from the metaphysical
suppositions of scientific materialism.
The evidence for soft perennialism—or
essentialism—presented in Taylor (2017a) includes the
various studies using Hood’s scale (suggesting a common
core of characteristics of mystical experiences across
and outside spiritual traditions); the examinations of
cross-traditional spiritual texts and reports of mystical
experiences made by Studstill (2005), Rose (2016), and
others; many cases of individuals who have experienced
expansive states of being outside the context (and
without knowledge) of spiritual traditions; a number
of similar themes in the process of spiritual awakening
across various traditions (as presented in Taylor, 2016);
accounts of the aftereffects of near-death experiences

and of the characteristics of post-traumatic growth; the
inadequacy of attempts to explain these commonalities
through neuroscientific reductionism, contextualism, or
radical diffusion, and so on. My own research has also
highlighted that both temporary awakening experiences
and ongoing states of what I have called wakefulness
often arise spontaneously outside spiritual traditions,
allowing for the possibility that there are realms of more
expansive potential human experience that precede and
inform spiritual traditions (see Taylor & Egeto-Szabo,
2017, for the most recent examples).
Ferrer (2002) has performed a worthwhile
service to the field of transpersonal psychology by
enacting the “participatory turn.” As he has noted, until
the end of the 1990s, transpersonal psychology was
strongly affiliated with perennialism (more specifically,
with a “hard” perennialist approach). Hartelius (2017b)
has written that perennialism was “introduced into
psychology by Wilber” (p. 121), but as Ferrer (2002)
has pointed out, Maslow (1970) had already suggested
perennial perspectives before then, and numerous
other transpersonal theorists besides Wilber adopted
perennialist perspectives (for example, Vaughan, 1982;
Grof, 1988; Harman, 1988; Wittine, 1989). As Ferrer
(2002) has written, “the philosophical foundations of
transpersonal theory have generally been associated with
perennial philosophy … and the spiritual universalism
typical of perennialism pervades both early and modem
transpersonal scholarship” (pp. 71-72). Indeed, as Ferrer
(2002) has noted, transpersonal psychology was often
defined in terms of perennialism or seen as an attempt to
apply or justify the principles of perennialism.
This movement away from this strong
association with perennialism has undoubtedly had
a liberating and invigorating effect, partly due to
the weakening influence of Wilber’s overly abstract
metaphysical model. However, it could be argued that
the pendulum has swung too far away in the other
direction, and that some transpersonal psychologists
have been too extreme in their mistrust of metaphysics
and any forms of essentialism (together with their
reluctance to consider so-called supernatural and
transcendent experiences) and in their desire to adopt
avowedly scientific approaches. Ideally, in my view, this
extreme swing will correct itself, and transpersonal
psychology will find a new balance which incorporates
more nuanced and subtle forms of perennialism (in
other words, “softer” forms of perennialism, equivalent
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to phenomenological perennialism or essentialism) and
allows for cautious and carefully justified metaphysical
claims.
Cultural Differences
ne should also be aware of cultural-geographical
differences that inform attitudes to transpersonal
psychology. The drive to “scientize” transpersonal
psychology may have special significance to transpersonal
theorists based in the United States, because of the
particular status of transpersonal psychology there.
Transpersonal psychology is certainly not an influential
field in the UK, but it is not marginalized in the way
that it is in the United States. The British Psychological
Society (BPS) includes a Transpersonal Section, and
many transpersonal psychologists (including myself)
are members of the BPS and entitled to refer to
themselves as psychologists. Generally speaking, the
climate in psychology in the UK appears to be a little
“softer” than that in the United States, and more open
to perspectives and approaches that some psychologists
might see as nonscientific. For example, the journal
of the British Psychological Society (The Psychologist)
has recently had themed issues devoted to qualitative
research methods and research into psychedelics and has
published articles on transpersonal-related themes such
as ecstatic experiences, neurological interpretations of
mystical experiences, and mindfulness. In the United
States, transpersonal psychology appears to have a lower
standing, and to be largely seen as pseudoscientific. It
is therefore perhaps understandable that theorists such
as Hartelius and Friedman have been working hard to
advance its scientific credentials, by trying to free it
from what skeptics call “woo,” and turning away from
areas that are controversial from the perspective of
materialist science (such as psi phenomena and mystical
experiences).
In itself, this is a laudable enterprise. The
invocation to make the field more research-based
and to incorporate more quantitative (as well as
qualitative) research is very welcome. However, as
suggested above, the “scientizing” approach has
arguably gone too far and runs the risk of separating
transpersonal psychology from its traditional and
natural alliance with post-materialist perspectives,
and alienating the field form its potential adherents.
Rather than adopting mainstream psychological
approaches and distancing itself from other post-

O
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materialist fields (such as near-death studies and
parapsychology), it should cooperate with the latter
in an effort to highlight the deficiencies of materialist
metaphysics and the viability of post-materialist
approaches. It is possible to envision a healthy form
of transpersonal psychology that takes a rigorously
scientific approach at the same time as adopting
post-materialistic metaphysical perspectives, thereby
making a significant contribution to cultural change.
A transpersonal psychologist I met at a
conference recently told me that, despite repeated
attempts to persuade her, she has never engaged in
a written dialogue in an academic journal. She felt
that the dialogue process can easily become a kind
of alpha male dueling in which researchers hold fast
to their own positions, take swipes at each other, and
bat away each other’s criticisms, bouncing back and
forth without reaching any resolution. This dialogue
has certainly included those elements to some degree,
but at the same time I feel that it has been productive,
particularly in stimulating me to further deliberation
and consideration of my own theories and approaches
to research. I wish to thank Glenn Hartelius for the
opportunity to debate these important issues and hope
that we have stimulated other theorists to address
them.
Notes
1. In my view, throughout this dialogue, Hartelius
has underestimated the influence of metaphysical
assumptions, both within transpersonal approaches
and science in general. For example, in Hartelius
(2017b) a number of supposed non-metaphysical
and non-authoritarian approaches to transpersonal
psychology are recommended, including Friedman’s
scientific approach and Ferrer’s participatory
approaches. However, it is debatable whether either
Friedman’s or Ferrer’s approaches are actually
metaphysics-free. As Ferrer (2014) has argued,
Friedman’s approach to transpersonal psychology
“effectively binds transpersonal psychology to a
naturalistic metaphysical worldview that is hostile
to most spiritual knowledge claims” (p. 152). At
the same time, I have argued above that Ferrer’s
own approach includes metaphysical assumptions,
and that his insistence on the undetermined nature
of the “mystery” could be construed as a reluctance

Taylor

to be open about his metaphysical position (Taylor,
2017a).
2. In Ferrer (2014) a similar approach to mine in this
paper is suggested, with the view that rather than
binding itself to scientific naturalism, transpersonal
psychology should adopt an “open naturalism” that
is free from materialism and reductionism and
“open to both the ontological integrity of spiritual
referents and the plausibility of subtle dimensions
of reality” (p. 174).
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